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THIRD PARTY MORAL HAZARD AND THE PROBLEM OF INSURANCE EXTERNALITIES
Gideon Parchomovsky* and Peter Siegelman**
Revision of Nov 4, 2021
Insurance can lead to loss or claim-creation not just by insureds themselves, but also by uninsured
third parties. These externalities—which we term “third party moral hazard”—arise because
insurance creates opportunities both to extract rents and to recover for otherwise unrecoverable losses.
Using examples from health, automobile, kidnap, and liability insurance, we demonstrate that the
phenomenon is widespread and important, and that the downsides of insurance are greater than
previously believed. We explain the economic, social and psychological reasons for this phenomenon,
and propose policy responses. Contract-based methods that are traditionally used to control ﬁrst-party
moral hazard can be welfare-reducing in the context of its third-party analog, so new approaches are
required.
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INTRODUCTION
The problem of moral hazard has preoccupied insurance economics: it has been the subject of
almost 1,600 scholarly articles since Arrow’s (1963) pathbreaking analysis and the term has
appeared in more than 850 judicial opinions since the 19th century.1 But scholars and courts
have focused exclusively on how insurance alters the insured policyholder’s incentives for
loss-prevention. The possibility that insurance might inﬂuence the conduct of those who are not
parties to the insurance contract—a kind of insurance externality—has been noticed by a few
scholars, but remains undeveloped and uncharacterized as a general phenomenon. 2 We call this
eﬀect “third party moral hazard,” deﬁned as the inﬂuence of insurance on the loss-creation or
claiming behavior of non-parties to the insurance contract. Our main contribution is to
demonstrate that third party moral hazard is both widespread and signiﬁcant, and to oﬀer an
assessment of causes and consequences.
Consider several representative examples: Kidnap insurance covers some or all of the ransom
demands made by kidnappers. There is evidence that the presence of kidnap insurance leads to
more kidnappings, and several countries have banned such insurance, or attempted to do so.
Insurance seems to raise the proﬁtability of kidnapping and encourage “entry” by kidnappers
(Weil 2014). An identical logic applies to insurance against cyber-ransoms, which has also been
linked to an increase in attacks (Dudley 2019).
Third party moral hazard has also permeated the healthcare industry, where over-billing and
outright fraud are enabled by the presence of insurance. Liability insurance, too, gives rise to
third party moral hazard. For example, Directors and Oﬃcers Liability Insurance has
apparently led to more litigation against corporate defendants (Donelson et al 2018). Some of
this increase may have been strike suits designed to extract settlement oﬀers; but insurance can
also lead to an increase in meritorious claims that would not otherwise have been brought (for
example, if the defendant is judgment-proof: Shavell 1986; Levin 2019).
What do these examples (and there are many more) have in common? First, each illustrates how
the presence of insurance can create an incentive for loss- or claim-creation by those who are not
party to the contract of insurance. A second commonality among most—but not all—of these
examples is that they represent a form of unproductive rent-seeking behavior (Tullock 1966), in
the sense that they are attempts to extract or transfer wealth from one party to another. Some of
1

Key insights were further developed by Pauly (1968), Holmstrom (1979) and Shavell (1979).
A recent exception is Balafoutas et al (2017, 1), who experimentally study what they term
“second-degree moral hazard” in the market for credence goods. This occurs when “the supply side in
a market . . . react[s] to anticipated moral hazard on the demand side by increasing the extent or price
of the service.” In their experiment, taxi drivers charged roughly 17 percent more to passengers who
let it be known that their expenses would be reimbursed than to those who didn’t. Kerschbamer et al
(2016) report similar results in a ﬁeld experiment involving computer repairs: customers who reported
that they were insured received substantially higher repair bills. For further discussion, see
Huber (2020). For a recent discussion of general equilibrium eﬀects of insurance and its eﬀects on
third parties, see Baharad (2021).
2
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these activities constitute insurance fraud,3 and some of them are crimes (Manes 1944), but the
concept of third party moral hazard is both broader and narrower than fraud or criminality.
Moreover, third party moral hazard even reaches some activities with positive welfare eﬀects,
such as the pursuit of meritorious suits against defendants whose assets, without insurance,
would be insuﬃcient to pay for a judgment rendered against them. In that instance, the
presence of insurance incentivizes claims that should be brought, but would not have been in its
absence.
Our analysis draws from and contributes to two literatures. The ﬁrst is insurance law and
economics (Schwarcz and Siegelman 2017; 2015). Despite its neglect by scholars, our most
important point is simply that third party moral hazard matters. Imagine that 75 percent of all
policyholders are subject to conventional moral hazard, which leads them to reduce their level
of precautions by 10 percent. Assume further that this drop in precautions leads to a 5 percent
increase in losses for this group, so that total losses rise by 3.7 percent. Even if only 1 percent of
the public is subject to third party moral hazard, the damage done by this group’s deliberate
loss-creation could easily be as large as the primary moral hazard eﬀect. The purposeful
loss-creation of the few may be more harmful than the modest additional negligence of the
many.
Third party moral hazard has other important consequences for insurance markets as well. For
one thing, it often cannot be eﬀectively controlled by many of the standard techniques that
insurers use to limit its ﬁrst-party cousin (Ben-Shahar & Logue 2012). Neither deductibles nor
loss controls (contractually-mandated precautions) are likely to be eﬀective against third party
moral hazard; and some loss controls that reduce traditional moral hazard may have negative
consequences when used against its third party variant. Moreover, the costs of third party moral
hazard (and of attempts to limit it) will be passed on to insurance customers. This in turn
reduces the demand for insurance, limits the eﬃcacy of risk-spreading, and can even induce
follow-on selection eﬀects. So in addition to the actual costs of third party moral hazard, there

3

For example, under Connecticut law,
[a] person is guilty of insurance fraud when the person, with the intent to injure, defraud
or deceive any insurance company: (1) Presents … to any insurance company, any …
statement . . . as part of . . . any application for any policy of insurance or a claim for
payment or other beneﬁt pursuant to such policy of insurance, knowing that such
statement contains any false, incomplete, or misleading information concerning any fact or
thing material to such application or claim; or (2) assists, abets, solicits, or conspires with
another to prepare or make any . . . statement that is intended to be presented to any
insurance company in connection with . . . any application for any policy of insurance or
any claim for payment … knowing that such statement contains any false, incomplete, or
misleading information concerning any fact or thing material to such application or claim
for the purposes of defrauding such insurance company.
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53a-215 (West).
Relevant scholarship on the theory and empirics of insurance fraud and related issues is substantial,
and includes Derrig (2002), Parsons (2003), Picard (2013), Pottier & Witt (1994), Syverud (1994), and
Tennyson (2008).

3
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are the costs of combating it, and spillover eﬀects on insurance consumers and the industry as a
whole.
We also draw on criminal law theories of “displacement” (Reppetto 1976; Ayres & Levitt 1998),
to argue that precautions against third party moral hazard may have diﬀerent eﬃciency
consequences from those taken against conventional risks covered by insurance. Human-caused
risks such as third party moral hazard have a strategic aspect that naturally-occurring
misfortunes lack (Hirshleifer 1953). If an actor’s precautions simply divert harmful activity
somewhere else, without reducing overall risk, social and private beneﬁts will diverge. Private
eﬀorts to deter many human-engendered strategic risks, even if successful at the individual
level, are therefore not as socially beneﬁcial as they appear to be. That insight feeds back into
insurance theory. Insurer-mandated loss controls will often divert, rather than prevent,
human-caused losses or claims. Once third party moral hazard is taken into account, the welfare
consequences of loss controls become more complicated than ordinary accounts (Ben-Shahar &
Logue 2012) tend to suggest.
Accordingly, to ameliorate third party moral hazard, it is necessary to adopt a combination of
procedural and substantive mechanisms that allow insurers’ to deal with the problem. Our
suggested remedial approaches range from precautions mandated by insurance companies, to
governmental assistance to the authorization of qui tam suits.
Part I provides a series of case studies of third party moral hazard in several domains of
insurance. Part II considers several mechanisms that can explain the phenomenon. Part III
suggests some policy responses.
1. THIRD PARTY MORAL HAZARD IN ACTION
In this Part, we draw on evidence from existing studies to discuss the existence and empirical
signiﬁcance of third party moral hazard in several domains of insurance. The cases we discuss
span a range of insurance contexts and oﬀer abundant evidence that the phenomenon is worthy
of attention.
1.1. Liability Insurance
1.1.1. Directors & Oﬃcers (D&O) Liability Insurance
Directors and Oﬃcers (“D&O”) liability insurance protects corporate oﬃcials, as well as the
corporation itself, against potential liability arising from negligent actions and omissions that
harm the corporation (Baker & Griﬃth 2007a). D&O liability insurance pervades the corporate
world (Baker & Griﬃth 2007b) and covers virtually all public corporations in the U.S. and
Canada.
Champions of D&O liability insurance contend that it lowers “the cost of compensating
risk-averse directors and oﬃcers and encourages them to take appropriate business risks”
(Holderness 1990, 115-16). Detractors maintain “that liability insurance largely nulliﬁes the
disciplining potential of litigation, causing directors and oﬃcers to be less attentive to their
duties to shareholders” (Holderness 1990, 116), a version of conventional moral hazard.

4
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Regardless of these eﬀects, the key question for present purposes is whether the existence of
D&O liability insurance creates third party moral hazard, in the form of enhanced incentives for
litigation. At ﬁrst blush, it seems clear that the answer is “yes” (Parsons 2003). Dan Puchniak
(2012, 17) listed “the high levels of directors and oﬃcers (D&O) liability insurance,” as one of
the principal factors that contribute to the high rate of derivative litigation in the U.S. Lin et al
(2011, 507) note the possibility that D&O insurance “can attract frivolous shareholder suits.”
Studies from other countries seem to suggest the same conclusion. For example, Mark West
(2001) studied the spike in derivative litigation in Japan in the 1990s, and suggested that the
presence of insurance was the main driver of the litigation trend. He suggested, however, that
the causal mechanism was not necessarily third party moral hazard, but rather standard moral
hazard: corporate directors and oﬃcers became less circumspect in the fulﬁllment of their duties
once they knew they were insured (West 2001, 376).
A careful examination of the relationship between the presence of D & O insurance and
derivative litigation rates reveals a more nuanced picture, however. The high rate of derivative
litigation in the U.S., relative to other countries, cannot prove, on its own, that D&O liability
insurance generates a third party moral hazard problem. Nor can the fact that companies with
high D&O liability insurance coverage get sued more often. There are three possible
explanations for the fact that ﬁrms with D&O liability insurance are sued more often. The ﬁrst is
standard moral hazard. Directors and managers who have insurance tend to be less diligent in
the performance of their obligations. The second is that ﬁrms with high coverage are more
poorly managed to begin with: adverse selection leads the worst risks to purchase the most
insurance. The third explanation is third-party moral hazard:the presence of insurance directly
incentivizes litigation.
The three explanations are not mutually exclusive, and there are empirical studies that provide
support for each. For example, a recent study reports that ﬁrms with high D&O liability
insurance premiums are indeed more likely to be involved in litigation. In exploring the root
cause for the correlation, the authors arrive at the tentative conclusion that “the association we
ﬁnd is more likely attributable to opportunism or moral hazard in the managers’ actions”
(Gillan & Panasian 2015, 805). The article did not consider the possibility of third party moral
hazard, however.
A study that used data on Canadian corporations also reported signiﬁcant correlation between
D&O insurance premia and “the quality of ﬁrms’ governance” (Core 2000, 476). Core (1997, 84)
reports that “ﬁrms with greater litigation risk and higher distress probability are more likely to
purchase D&O insurance and carry higher limits). In analyzing the reasons for this ﬁnding,
Core endorses the second explanation, i.e., that higher D&O liability insurance is indicative of
poor governance structures. Here, too, we found no reference to the third party moral hazard
hypothesis.
Other empirical studies, however, are consistent with third party moral hazard. Tom Baker and
Sean Griﬃth (2007b) examined the elements that aﬀect settlements of class actions, using a
qualitative research methodology, i.e., interviews with industry participants responsible for

5
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settling securities cases. While Baker and Griﬃth do not focus on third party moral hazard or
expressly mention the term, the answers to their questions suggest that industry participants
view D&O insurance as a critical element that shapes their litigation strategy. As one
respondent, a claims head, asserted: “I think it is easier to get money out of an insurance carrier
than it is out of an insured. Why? Because it is a third party’s money” (2007b, 806-07). Baker and
Griﬃth further reported that another respondent, a plaintiﬀ’s lawyer, was far more speciﬁc
about the eﬀect of D&O liability insurance on plaintiﬀs’ motivation to sue, explaining that
plaintiﬀs’ lawyers “sue for insurance” (2007b, 805).
Finally, Donelson, et al (2018) reported a strong correlation between ﬁrms’ levels of D&O
insurance and their likelihood of being involved in securities litigation. Their study takes
advantage of a unique feature of New York law that mandates disclosure of D&O insurance
premia. No such requirement exists in the law of other states. The study then compares the
exposure to securities litigation of New York ﬁrms and non-New York ﬁrms. They note that
information about D&O premia have two possible eﬀects on litigation: First, high premia can
signal to lawyers a potential for high settlement rates. Second, high premiums may indicate that
the insurer thought that the ﬁrm represented a high legal risk. Analyzing a large database of
class actions brought against ﬁrms between 1998 and 2010, they found that “the relation
between premiums and litigation is stronger for ﬁrms incorporated in New York, compared to
ﬁrms incorporated elsewhere. As this relation is based on premium levels (rather than
disclosure presence), this implies that the disclosure content aﬀects litigation” (Donelson et al
2018, 530). The authors conclude that if D&O premia were known in all states, it would have led
to an increase of 12 to 19 percent in securities class-action litigation over the period they
studied.4 The potential costs of non-meritorious lawsuits are not trivial, and include “lawyer
fees, nuisance settlements for cases that survive a motion to dismiss, and lost managerial time,”
as well as an “undermin[ing of] the credibility of the U.S. securities litigation system” (Donelson
et al 2018, 531).
1.1.2. No-Fault Automobile Insurance
No-fault automobile insurance is designed to simplify the payment of lower-value claims and
reduce claims-processing costs. Rather than litigating who was at fault in smaller claims,
no-fault makes a policyholder’s own insurer responsible for compensating him or her. In New
York, for example, medical and other expenses totaling less than $50,000 are covered by each
insured’s (mandatory) Personal Injury Policy (PIP). More serious injuries can be litigated in the
usual manner, with the injurer’s insurer responsible for compensating the victim.
Even though no-fault operates as ﬁrst-party insurance, it oﬀers substantial opportunities for
third party moral hazard. The extent of the problem is hard to assess. Data are diﬃcult to obtain
and—if they are from insurers—almost impossible to verify. But there is abundant anecdotal
evidence demonstrating elaborate and well-organized schemes to falsify and exaggerate claims,
4

“Applying the higher dismissal rate of New York ﬁrms to the broader Compustat/CRSP sample
projects to between approximately 160 to 260 additional non-meritorious suits that might have been
ﬁled over the 13-year sample period, which is equivalent to 12% to 19% total securities class actions
over this period” (Donelson, et al 2018, 531).

6
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run as sophisticated criminal enterprises in several states (Dornstein 1998).5 According to
testimony by a Michigan doctor who ran an MRI facility outside of Detroit, for example, a
prominent “TV lawyer,” Mike Morse, repeatedly leaned on him to exaggerate the severity of
injuries detected in MRI scans of patients referred to him by Morse (Wisely & Reindel 2017). A
network of chiropractors and physical therapists was also used to overbill for treatments and
make and receive referrals (Gunalabam, 2017). The same pattern was documented in a criminal
complaint against more than two dozen defendants ﬁled by the United States Attorney for the
Southern District of New York in 2015 against numerous medical clinics that were described in
the indictment as “medical fraud mills that routinely billed automobile insurance companies
under the No Fault Law for medical treatments that were either (i) never provided and/or (ii)
unnecessary, because the Patients did not medically need the treatments” (Bharara, 2015).
Although New York law requires that medical clinics be “owned, operated and controlled” by a
licensed medical practitioner (a doctor), the defendants apparently hired doctors to serve as
fronts for the clinics, while secretly owning and controlling the operations of the clinics
themselves. The no-fault clinics also employed “runners” (recruiters) who were paid
$2,000-$3,000 per patient brought into the clinic (depending on the quality of the accident report
ﬁled with the patient’s injury).
This was not the only such organized scheme. A 2018 article in the New York Times (Rashbaum
et al 2018) reported that “countless phony companies were cropping up [in the early 2000’s] to
exploit so-called no-fault auto insurance laws in New York.” These companies “staged or
exaggerated car accidents” and then set up billing companies “to collect money from insurers...”
Estimates of the magnitude of third party moral hazard in no-fault insurance vary substantially.
A widely-cited insurance industry report put no-fault fraud losses in New York at $230-$240
million in 2009 (Insurance Information Institute, n.d.). But others have disputed that estimate,
and the details of the calculation never seem to have been made public, so it is diﬃcult to
verify.6 According to the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, the industry’s
5

Consistent with the exaggeration of losses so as to cross the liability threshold for tort claims,
Anderson, et al (2010, 97-111), ﬁnd evidence in some no fault states of discontinuities or kinks in the
distribution of claims: fewer-than-expected claims just below the threshold and more-than-expected
claims just above it. They also conclude (2010, 111) that there has been “an increase in prevalence of
suspicious claims in no-fault states over time.”
6
According to one (partisan) source (Israel 2011),
[t]he breadth of fraud, suggested by the industry, is simply exaggerated and untrue. . .
Indeed, even a cursory review of the industry statistics lead them to be questioned. For
example, one industry-funded source claims that no-fault fraud cost $240 million in 2009. . .
However, a simple multiplication of the total number of reported questionable claims to
the Insurance Department last year by the average cost of the entire no-fault claim that is
being discussed today actually equals to $116 million, literally half of what is being
asserted by the industry. And yes, while $116 million in suspective [sic] fraud sounds like
and is a lot, it . . . [amounts to] roughly 1 percent of [the $9.9 billion in] premium dollars
collected by NY auto insurers [in 2009].

7
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incurred losses on PIP policies in New York in 2009 amounted to $1.6 billion (National
Association of Insurance Commissioners, 2009-10). So the $240 million estimate for no-fault
fraud (almost all of which is probably third party moral hazard) amounts to 15 percent of all
losses; opponents have suggested that this is too high by a factor of 2, but even if we put the
ﬁgure at 7.5 percent, it translates to a loss of $120 million.
1.2. Health Insurance
The tangled relationships among insurers, individual policyholders, drug companies, doctors,
and hospitals are rife with examples of third parties creating or exaggerating expenses so as to
take advantage of what insurance will pay for (Delgado et al 2014). Indeed, the malign eﬀects of
third-party moral hazard in health care are the major theme of a recent 550-page book by legal
scholars Charles Silver and David Hyman (Silver & Hyman 2018). In the forward to that book, a
former Dean of Harvard Medical school opined that the “root cause[ ]” of waste and excessive
spending in healthcare is “the . . . overreliance on insurance and other forms of third party
payment” to cover medical expenses (Flier 2018, xx). In Silver and Hyman’s view, healthcare is
all about third party moral hazard writ large: “health care is expensive because it is insured. . . .
Insurance makes healthcare more expensive than it would be if people paid for it themselves”
(Silver & Hyman 2018 at 295).
Economists have long recognized the potential for conventional moral hazard in health care,
and have suggested that doctors might serve as vital checks on the tendency of insured patients
to demand more care than is optimal (Arrow 1968, 538). But since Evans (1974), economists have
also understood that “physician-induced demand” can be a source of increased healthcare
spending (see, Johnson, 2014 for a survey). Notably, however, the theoretical literature seems
not to have focussed on the role of insurance in demand inducement—Johnson’s survey pays no
attention to insurance, nor does it list any sources that do.
1.2.1 Drug Rehab Clinics
The presence of insurance has contributed to serious wrongdoing in the provision of
rehabilitation services for opioid addicts (Lurie 2019; Wooten 2019). Some states now host a
sizeable industry of for-proﬁt rehab centers that oﬀer recruiting bonuses to freelance “patient
brokers” to attract addicts whose treatment can be billed to their insurer. Such rehabilitation
services are considered “essential beneﬁts” under the Aﬀordable Care Act,7 and must be oﬀered
without annual or lifetime caps, creating a large pool of money that unscrupulous centers can tap
into. Their business model is to bring in patients for “treatment” that is completely ineﬀective,
precisely so as to generate a relapse and readmission shortly thereafter. This practice is known in
the addiction community as “the Florida shuﬄe,” “a cycle wherein recovering users are wooed

7

See 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)(1)(E) (2010) (deﬁning Essential Health Beneﬁts to include “Mental health and
substance use disorder services, including behavioral health treatment”).
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aggressively by [for proﬁt rehabilitation centers] and freelance ‘patient brokers’ in an eﬀort to ﬁll
beds and collect insurance money.”8
Rehab centers can charge private insurers as much as $50,000-$100,000 per month of treatment;
and private insurance claims for treatment of opioid users rose from $75 million in 2011 to $650
million in 2014 (lurie 2019). The availability of generous insurance payments has helped create an
entire industry of phony rehabilitation programs whose purpose is precisely not to cure
addiction, but rather to maintain it as a source of ongoing revenue.9
1.2.2. Copay Coupons for Branded Drugs
Health insurers have an obvious interest in incentivizing patients (and their doctors) to choose
lower-cost generic drugs instead of branded drugs that are medically identical. One mechanism
used to create such incentives has been to set a higher copayment by the patient if she chooses
the branded drug instead of the generic alternative (Frakt, 2017; Dafny et al, 2018).
Manufacturers of branded drugs have ﬁgured out a way to subvert this incentive, however:
copay coupons. Suppose the copay on the brand-name drug is set at $65, while the generic
version has a copy of $10. The manufacturer gives the patient a coupon that covers $55 of the
branded copay, yielding the same out of pocket cost as for the $10 generic. If the seller makes an
additional $130 sale (the price paid by the insurer) by diverting the consumer from a generic
drug, the $55 copay subsidy generates a proﬁt of $75.
The eﬀects of copay coupons are large and negative, according to a recent study: “[C]oupons
increase branded sales by 60+ percent, entirely by reducing the sales of bioequivalent generics”
(Frakt 2017, 91). Copay coupons do not simply divert customers from cheaper generic substitutes
to branded alternatives, however. They also enable higher prices: the “coupon holds the
consumers’ prices ﬁxed at a low level. That allows the manufacturer to raise the overall price
without losing sales. This raises spending, too, but for the insurer” (Frakt 2017). According to the
best recent evidence, copay coupons cause several billion dollars in additional spending per year
(Dafny et al 2018).
Copay coupons are a compelling example of drug companies’ exploitation of insurance to charge
higher prices, but there are others. For example, Besanko et al (2016) conclude that the presence

8

h ps://www.ﬁxtheﬂoridashuﬄe.com/ﬂorida-shuﬄe. Even worse, reporting by Lurie (2019)
uncovered examples in which brokers actually induced recovering addicts to relapse so that they could
be referred to a “treatment” center.
9
Mitch Polinsky (personal communication) pointed out to us that a contractual solution to the problem
of drug rehab centers is available if insurers could simply buy and operate them themselves. The idea
of such “Integrated Delivery Systems” is a ractive, with some inﬂuential backers. As Enthoven (2009)
put it, “an organized, coordinated, and collaborative network that links various healthcare providers to
provide a coordinated, vertical continuum of services to a particular patient population or community”
can both reduce costs and improve the quality of healthcare.
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of insurance has enabled manufacturers of oral chemotherapy drugs to raise prices beyond the
estimates of the additional value the drugs create for consumers.
1.3. Kidnap insurance
The economics of kidnapping has been the subject of considerable analysis, both empirical and
theoretical (Vannini et al 2015; Fink and Pingle 2014). There is less on the impact of insurance,
however (Shortland 2017 and Shortland 2019 are important exceptions). A key ﬁnding of most
theoretical models is that the volume of kidnappings will depend on the average amount that
victims are willing and able to pay. In other words, there is an upward-sloping supply of
kidnaps, so that the higher the expected ransom, the greater the number of kidnappings (Vannini
et al 2015; Detotto 2015).
The question of interest to us is whether the presence of insurance enhances victims’ willingness
or ability to pay ransoms. If so, the availability of insurance would likely cause more kidnaps.
Common sense would seem to suggest an aﬃrmative answer (Clendenin 2006; Kenney 2008;
Dutton 2016; Block and Tinsley, 2008), as would at least some theoretical models of the kidnap
market. Fink and Pingle (2014, 491) point out that
[t]he provision of kidnap insurance might have an eﬀect on the probability
that kidnappings are contemplated. For instance, a potential kidnapper might
hear about a successful exchange of a victim for ransom that may have been
facilitated with the aid of an insurance company, or a potential kidnapper
might conclude from the presence of a kidnap insurance market that his
potential victims are on average willing to pay more ransom compared to the
situation when no kidnap insurance market exists.10
Indeed, in Fink & Pingle’s game theoretic model, “the existence of a competitive insurance
market [always] increases the maximum [ransom] demand a family is willing to pay.” The size of
the supply-side response to this increase is left open, however. Believing that kidnap insurance
aggravates the problem of kidnapping and the costs associated with it, Venezuela, Colombia, and
Italy have all banned kidnap insurance at one time or another (Vannini et al 2015, 8). And
anecdotal evidence suggests that kidnaps fell in the aftermath of such bans, although the causal
link is unclear. (For example, Bohlen (1978) points out that Italian policies that banned kidnap
insurance also dramatically discouraged the reporting of kidnappings.)

10

In the Fink & Pingle (2014, 493) model, the positive eﬀect of insurance on the volume of kidnapping
occurs whenever “insurance increases [victims’] maximum ransom oﬀer,” which in turn depends on some
technical conditions. Even if insurance increases total kidnappings, it might still reduce fatal kidnappings,
since higher ransom payments “push[ ] [some victim] oﬀers above the net willingness to kill of the
marginal kidnapper, reducing the fraction of fatal kidnappings.” The net eﬀect on the total volume of fatal
kidnappings depends on the relative size of the kidnap-increasing and fatality-reducing eﬀects.

10

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3554010

2. THE MECHANISMS OF THIRD PARTY MORAL HAZARD
In this Part, we investigate the possible causes of third party moral hazard. Since we are dealing
with a phenomenon that has received little systematic scholarly attention, we oﬀer several
possible mechanisms by which the presence of insurance causes third parties who are not privy
to the insurance contract to engage in risk causing or harm causing activities. We consider four
explanations: deep pockets/rent-seeking, poorer detection, depersonalization and spillovers
from traditional moral hazard.
2.1. Deep Pockets
The most straightforward explanation of third party moral hazard is that insurers are much
wealthier than policyholders, making them more attractive targets for ripping-oﬀ, simply
because they can cover larger losses. In many contexts, an uninsured entity’s ability to pay is
signiﬁcantly constrained by its wealth (Smith and Wright, 1992), but that is virtually never true
for an insurer.
For example, consider a staged motorcycle accident that was captured on a recent viral video
with more than 4 million views (Viralhog 2017). Shot from the dashboard camera of a car
travelling down a residential street in the U.K., it shows a motorcyclist wheeling his bike
backwards into the slow-moving car, slamming the cycle into the car, jumping on the hood and
smashing his head repeatedly against the windshield. The “victim” ends up on the ground,
writhing in pain. Meanwhile, a friend of his ﬁlms the aftermath of the incident. Absent
insurance, the money available to pay for an extracted settlement would likely be very low,
reducing the proﬁtability of this kind of scheme. The mandate that British motorists carry very
generous third party auto liability insurance11 thus makes such scams more proﬁtable.
Some rent-seeking schemes are only possible because of the presence of insurance. Organized
criminals in Sicily apparently developed a practice of deliberately inﬂicting signiﬁcant and
gruesome injuries to homeless people and drug addicts, in whose name they had previously
taken out insurance policies (D’Emilio 2018).12 Such behavior would obviously not be proﬁtable
if the victim were “uninsured,” since there would simply be no wealth to transfer in the absence
of insurance.
We note that the mere existence of deep pockets does not necessarily imply that rent-seeking is
always the explanation for third party moral hazard. For example, as Leslie Levin (2019, 113) has
noted in the context of legal malpractice litigation,

11

The Road Traﬃc Act, 1988, c. 52 §143(2) (Eng.) (as amended) requires coverage for any vehicle of at
least £1,200,000 ($1.7 million) in property damage.
12
Eleven people were arrested, and the amounts of money in question allegedly reached several
hundred thousand Euros in this case.
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[m]any solo and very small ﬁrm lawyers do not carry LPL [lawyer’s professional
liability] insurance. If there is no insurance . . . experienced plaintiﬀs’ lawyers will
almost never take on the malpractice case. Plaintiﬀs’ lawyers know that even if a case is
meritorious, they will not receive their contingent fee because there will be no money to
pay the judgment.
Our key point is that the same logic applies both to those creating losses (or feigning harm) and
those who experience genuine losses greater than the injurer’s wealth: there is no proﬁt in
making a claim—whether real or phony—for a loss that the injurer cannot pay. Thus, by
guaranteeing that there will be someone who is able to pay, the presence of insurance promotes
claiming, both meritorious and unmeritorious. It is that increase in claiming, whether for good or
ill, that constitutes third party moral hazard. Put diﬀerently, pockets can sometimes be “too
shallow” as well as too deep. When the presence of insurance induces additional claims by
relaxing liquidity constraints, third party moral hazard can actually be beneﬁcial.13
2.2. Depersonalization
Insurance companies are not ﬂesh and blood individuals. They are psychologically “remote”
corporate entities that are understood to be in the business of paying-out to cover losses. That
could lead third party loss-causers to feel less inhibited when dealing with an insurer than with
an individual who has to come up with the funds from her own bank account. For example,
Tennyson (1997, 260) concludes (based on a survey of consumer attitudes) that “tolerant attitudes
toward fraud will be expressed more often by individuals who have negative perceptions of
insurance institutions.“ Tennyson (2008) draws on a wider variety of evidence to reach similar
conclusions. Money paid out by an insurer probably has a diﬀerent moral and psychological
valence for loss-causers than money taken from the pocket of a particular individual.14

This phenomenon is similar to John Nyman’ (2004) “access motive” for health insurance
coverage. Consider a kidney transplant that costs $300,000 and will be required by 0.1% of the
population. Each person would be willing to pay $300 for coverage of a 0.1% risk of needing the
operation, but no one has the $300,000 to spend on her or his own. Without insurance, therefore,
there would be no transplants; with insurance, the cost of the procedure is no longer a constraint
on any individual’s ability to aﬀord it. As Nyman recognized, moral hazard can sometimes be
welfare-enhancing. It also bears a close relationship to Pauly and Held (1990)’s analysis of “benign
moral hazard” for coverage of preventative care.
14
A more traditional economic explanation concerns the diminishing marginal utility of wealth,
which drives demand for insurance. Given that dollars are especially valuable in low-wealth states
of the world, uninsured individual tortfeasors should be willing to invest heavily to contest
liability since they are spending in high-wealth, no-liability dollars to avoid having to pay in
low-wealth (post-liability) dollars. This makes them una ractive targets for third party
loss-causers, especially compared to insurers, who “only” have routine proﬁt motives at stake in
deciding whether to contest a claim.
13
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Baker (2001) describes the moral economy of “blood money” in tort litigation, and suggests that
these kinds of social/psychological concerns are widespread. Baker reports that plaintiﬀs’
lawyers rarely ask for more in damages than the limits of the defendant’s insurance policy: funds
obtained from an insured’s personal wealth (beyond what is covered by insurance) are known as
“blood money,” and there is a widespread norm among plaintiﬀ’s lawyers against going after
such assets (unless the tortfeasor has deliberately chosen to under-insure). These ﬁndings are
consistent with the hypothesis that loss-causers might feel diﬀerently about taking money from
insurers than from identiﬁable individuals.
The fact that the Federal Rules of Evidence bar juries from hearing about a defendant’s liability
insurance (or lack thereof) lends further support to the depersonalization theory. F.R.E. 411 states
that
[e]vidence that a person was or was not insured against liability is not admissible to prove
whether the person acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully. . . .
This so-called “Insurance Exclusionary rule” originated in 19th century common law, and is
apparently based on the idea that “a jury confronted with a sympathetic plaintiﬀ and informed
that a well-healed defendant is insured may, despite lack of evidence of wrongdoing, ﬁnd the
defendant liable and impose a large award to provide for the plaintiﬀ“ (Greene et al (2008, 196)).
The presence of insurance seems to matter to jurors; it probably also matters to claimants
(whether bona ﬁde or not).
2.3. Poorer Detection or Worse Bargaining
Beyond enhancing ability to pay, another reason why the presence of insurance may make for
more loss-causing by third parties is that it can enhance willingness to pay: insurers may be in a
worse position to detect false or fraudulent claims than are the individuals to whom such claims
would otherwise be made. Or, insurers might be more generous (pay out more per dollar
claimed) than individuals who are paying out of their own pockets.
We don’t have much evidence on these issues, but consider the example of no-fault auto
insurance fraud in New York. According to a veteran fraud prosecutor (Ferguson, 2011),
fraudulent claimants were able to swamp insurers’ claims-handling and investigation resources
by submitting phony or exaggerated claims for reimbursement at a rate that was too high for
insurers to handle within statutorily required time limits for payment of claims. Insurers thus
ended up paying-out on claims that an individual tortfeasor would almost certainly not have
conceded.
More generally, bad faith liability for an insurer’s failure to pay a claim could lead to similar
eﬀects (Browne, Pryor & Puelz 2004). If insurers are subject to treble damages for wrongly failing
to pay a claim, they will at the margin be induced to pay some questionable claims that an
individual paying out of his or her own funds would have been willing to contest (Tennyson &
Warfel 2008). In turn, insurers’ reluctance to challenge some claims makes loss-creation more
proﬁtable for third parties.
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Of course, the reverse possibility also needs to be considered: insurers might well be better at
detecting illegal claims than individuals would be. A high-volume claims-processing operation
could be in position to observe suspicious patterns in claiming that would be invisible to an
individual who only sees a single request for payment. And it is likely that there are economies
of scale in fraud-detection that insurers are better-placed to take advantage of than are individual
payors. As for skill in negotiating, Shortland (2017) reports that kidnap insurers drive
considerably tougher bargains than individuals. These insurers form a kind of loose cartel; and
they are repeat players, not one-shotters, so they internalize the costs that higher ransom payouts
(in today’s kidnapping) cause in the form of more future kidnappings due to deep
pockets/supply side response.
2.4. Spillovers from Ordinary Moral Hazard
Third party moral hazard can also occur as a kind of general equilibrium spillover that ﬂows
from ordinary ﬁrst party moral hazard. The idea is that when (ﬁrst) party X obtains insurance,
(third) party Y—whose function is to monitor or protect X—now has less of a reason to do so.
(Recall that there is an insurer who constitutes the “second” party.) The presence of insurance
may thus alter Y’s behavior. We think of this as “communicable” Moral Hazard because it
spreads from insureds to those who interact with them. For instance, insurance may replace or
crowd-out monitoring by others, since the beneﬁts of such monitoring are reduced if one’s
counterparty is insured. Goldberg (2009) argues similarly that corporate demand for liability
insurance is best explained by the desires of suppliers and customers to rid themselves of
various ﬁnancial monitoring tasks and outsource them to their counterparty’s insurer.
Consider the specialized and generous form of insurance coverage known as jeweler’s block
policies, which cover the theft of precious stones from jewelers.15 If thieves know that most
jewelers have such coverage, they may be more likely to commit robberies, since they expect that
ﬁrst party moral hazard on the part of jewelers will make theft easier. More mundanely, there is
evidence that auto or computer repair shops, taxicabs, and other service providers raise prices
for consumers who are not paying out of pocket, and thus face reduced incentives to shop for a
good deal (Balafoutas et al, 2017; Kerschbamer et al 2016). In this scenario, ordinary moral
hazard occurs when insurance reduces policyholders’ incentives to undertake comparison
shopping at a given price level; third party moral hazard is reﬂected in sellers’ charging higher
equilibrium prices because insurance has made demand less elastic by separating the costs of
search (borne by insureds) from its beneﬁts (which accrue to insurers).
Sometimes, however, the contagion may move directly from the insurer to third parties, even
without any ﬁrst party moral hazard. Third party moral hazard of this kind might have played a
key role in the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008.16 Financial economist Darrell Duﬃe (2018, 99) rejects
“[c]onventional moral-hazard explanations of the excessive pre-crisis leverage of the big banks”
15

Judge Posner discusses these policies and their potential for conventional moral hazard in A.M.I.
Diamonds Company v. Hanover Insurance Company, 397 F.3d 528, 530 (7th Cir. 2005).
16
Thanks to Gary Klein for this insight.
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and suggests instead that the “insured” ﬁnancial ﬁrms “did not even need to think about the
moral hazard of [their own] government bailouts—they merely needed to observe the
exceptionally low costs of debt ﬁnancing oﬀered to them by creditors.” Rather than directly
increasing risk-taking by insureds, this is a story in which insurance erodes market discipline:
When a bank is understood to be “Too Big to Fail,” its lenders reason that there’s no need to
monitor it or charge a penalty for its risky behavior, and it thus faces reduced incentives to be
careful.
3. POLICY AND WELFARE IMPLICATIONS
In this Part, we detail the costs of third party moral hazard and the eﬃcacy and eﬃciency of
private sector attempts to limit it. Our bottom line is simple: controlling the loss-causing or
claiming behavior of third parties is diﬃcult for insurers, and even when it is possible, it may
have counterproductive eﬀects on welfare. We conclude that extra-contractual measures are
needed to eﬃciently limit third party moral hazard, and we suggest several possibilities.
3.1. The Costs (and Beneﬁts?) of Third Party Moral Hazard
In assessing the cost of third party moral hazard, it is important to distinguish between three
kinds of costs that such behavior may impose. First, there are “primary” losses. Most economists
would argue that payments made to kidnappers or fake accident victims do not themselves
constitute social losses. Such payments merely transfer wealth between parties, at least to the
extent that they do not use up any resources in the process (Tullock 1967). But kidnappings and
other sources of third party moral hazard do generate real losses, including stress and hassle for
kidnap victims and their families, the costs of negotiating ransoms, and so on. And even fake
accidents can entail some actual harms: for example, if the “victim” in the auto accident had
actually sustained an injury in staging the accident, this would constitute a social loss
attributable to insurance.17
In addition, third party moral hazard generates “secondary” losses in the form of the resources
used in creating fake losses (for example, the time and eﬀort to stage them). These expenditures
constitute true losses from society’s perspective. So too do additional expenses by insurers to
audit for fraud or otherwise prevent, detect, or deter third parties from their rent-seeking
behavior.

17

In some cases, victims may suﬀer real harm, even if their initial injuries were not real. Consider a well
known case involving the deliberate and large-scale mis-diagnosis of silicosis by a ring of doctors and
lawyers (In Re Silica Products Liability Litigation 398 F. Supp. 2d 563 (S.D. Tex. 2005)). Most of those
diagnosed with the disease were not in fact suﬀering from it: they were “screened” by fake diagnostic
ﬁrms that colluded with the plaintiﬀs’ lawyers. Some of the victims subsequently sued their lawyers,
alleging that they “suﬀered injuries, both ﬁnancially and mentally, in that they lived their lives
[wrongly] believing they had been diagnosed with the incurable disease of silicosis” while their
lawyers “reaped the proﬁts of any false diagnosis” Canﬁeld (2013).
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Finally, third party moral hazard may also generate through the creation or worsening of adverse
selection problems. Notice to begin that even if payments by insurers to “victims” are not true
social costs, they are certainly real from the perspective of the insurer paying the claim. As such,
they represent ﬁnancial costs that the insurer has to cover, and in a competitive equilibrium, they
will be recovered in the form of higher prices for insurance. Higher prices, in turn, make
insurance less attractive to the least risky (marginal) customers. That’s because the marginal
customer (the one just willing to buy insurance at the going rate) is typically less risky than the
average customer among all those buying. Pushing people out of the market will lower welfare:
those who value insurance by more than it would have cost to provide it to them will suﬀer a
loss (Einav & Finkelstein 2011).18
3.2. Self-Help by Insurers
Insurers have developed a well-known arsenal of weapons to combat ﬁrst party moral hazard,
comprising at least the following seven techniques: (a) deductibles and copays (b) exclusions; (c)
underwriting to screen high-propensity individuals; (d) experience rating; (e) loss controls; (f) ex
post auditing of claims; and (g) ex ante monitoring.
There is a broad consensus among scholars of insurance law and economics that, in combination,
these measures are reasonably eﬀective at controlling ﬁrst party moral hazard in most contexts
(Baker 1996; Avraham, 2012; Ben-Shahar & Logue 2012; Shavell 1982). But these mechanisms are
inoperative or ineﬀective when applied to third party moral hazard, and eﬀorts to control
deliberate loss-causing behavior have diﬀerent welfare consequences from attempts to control
ordinary moral hazard.
The ﬁrst four techniques (deductibles, exclusions, underwriting and experience rating) govern
risk via the contract between the insurer and the policyholder; they are of little use in
constraining the loss-causing behavior of third parties. True, an insured with a substantial
deductible will have some reason to prevent loss-causing by third parties, since she or he bears
some share of any loss that occurs. But this eﬀect is likely fairly small, and in some cases, may
even worsen the problem of third party moral hazard (Sulzle & Wambach 2005). Experience
rating also oﬀers an insured a modest reason to limit losses caused by third parties, since even if
she is covered for a current loss, her future premiums will increase as a consequence of any claim
she makes. Underwriting is presumptively irrelevant to third party moral hazard, since the
insured’s character or riskiness is not really at issue in the occurrence of losses caused by third
parties. Similarly, exclusions are of limited value in deterring third party behavior, since the
primary conduct that is excluded is that of the insured, while the loss is caused by someone else.
That leaves the last three techniques—loss control, ex post auditing, and monitoring—as the
primary methods available to insurers to limit third party moral hazard. These may be eﬀective

18

Recent theoretical developments also point to a link in the opposite direction, suggesting that the
existence of adverse selection can lead to additional fraud (Boyer and Peter 2019).

16

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3554010

in some contexts, but they pose signiﬁcant problems for public policy that are unique to third
party moral hazard.
3.2.1. Loss Control
In some settings, insurers can and do provide instruction to policyholders on how to avoid or
mitigate risks posed by third parties. Loss control services are frequently bundled with the
provision of kidnap insurance, for example (Shortland 2019), and consist mostly of advice on
security—how big a wall to build around one’s house, which areas of the city to avoid, and so
on.
Third-party generated losses are more diﬃcult to control than those caused by ﬁrst parties,
however. Third parties are active loss-causers, who have agency and strategic capability. Steam
boilers do not take countermeasures to increase their ability to explode if they are inspected more
frequently. Kidnappers and pirates, however, do respond to eﬀorts to limit their eﬀectiveness.
Moreover, some third party activities are simply not amenable to loss control directed at ﬁrst
parties. Drug copays and excessive MRI use cannot easily be mitigated by training policyholders
about how to avoid such losses. Indeed, even when consumers are coached to use cheaper MRIs,
they don’t do so (Lagasse 2018).
Some kinds of liability insurance—for example, Directors and Oﬃcers policies—might seem to
be amenable to loss control activities directed against third parties. Insurers could provide
companies with advice on implementing best practices for corporate governance so as to reduce
the risk of being sued for a violation of corporate law, for example. But in practice, D&O insurers
do not seem to make widespread use of loss control, for reasons that are not well understood
(Baker & Griﬃth 2006; we discuss insurers’ creative use of the duty to defend to control third
party moral hazard below).
By contrast, Employment Practices Liability (EPL) insurers widely tout their loss-control services
as part of their marketing eﬀorts (Talesh 2015). But even when loss control can be used
eﬀectively, limiting payouts to third parties has diﬀerent welfare implications than preventing
ﬁrst party losses. There are at least two important diﬀerences between ﬁrst- and third-party loss
controls in liability insurance.
3.2.1.1. Harm Reduction vs Liability Reduction
The ﬁrst is the distinction between loss prevention and harm prevention. In ﬁrst party moral
hazard, preventing losses is straightforward: the insurer tells the policyholder how to inspect his
boiler to minimize the chance it will explode, or how to store chemicals to prevent a leak. But
there are actually two kinds of “prevention” at work in the context of liability insurance:
forestalling legal liability (conditional on harm) and preventing the occurrence of the harm itself.
For example, many EPL insurers advertise their ability to help employers “bullet-proof” their
employment policies by establishing proper training procedures, reﬁning language in employee
handbooks, and so on (Talesh 2015). Following best practices for Human Resources management
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may indeed reduce the likelihood that a plaintiﬀ is successful in a lawsuit against the insured.
But preventing liability ex post is not the same as preventing the actual occurrence of losses ex
ante, and most employer training probably has little or no eﬀect on actual behavior—that is, on
losses resulting from employee misconduct, such as harassment. Grossman (2003, 3) concludes
that “[s]exual harassment policies and procedures do not seem to have any reliably negative
eﬀect on the incidence of sexual harassment.” Other scholars who have looked at the issue agree
(Dobbin & Kalev 2016): loss control in the context of EPL insurance has become a kind of
“bureaucratic vaccine against lawsuits for harassment.” (Dobbin and Kelly 2007, 1234 (emphasis
added)).
Loss controls that actually reduce the incidence of harms ex ante are diﬀerent from those that
simply forestall liability ex post. Cost-eﬀective harm reduction beneﬁts both the insured and
potential victims (who are not injured), with clear positive welfare eﬀects. Forestalling liability
(without reducing harm) will presumably deter some third parties from loss-causing behavior:
fake victims are less likely to ﬁle lawsuits if such suits are less likely to succeed. But if insureds
can defeat liability without actually reducing harms, then even victims with legitimate claims are
less likely to succeed. Reducing the success rate of plaintiﬀs (without reducing the incidence of
harm) deters deliberate loss-causers, but at a cost of leaving all losses where they fall, even for
innocent victims who did nothing to cause their loss. Loss-controls work diﬀerently in the
context of third party moral hazard.
3.2.1.2. Diversion
A second problem with eﬀorts to control losses from third parties is that they may lead to the
strategic diversion of harm-causing activity (Reppetto (1976); Mikos (2006) oﬀers a dissenting
view). For example, suppose a kidnap insurer advises a policyholder to build a larger wall
around his house to deter kidnappers. If the wall does its job, it will reduce the likelihood of
third party moral hazard directed at the policyholder (and his insurer). But it will likely do so by
deﬂecting potential kidnappers towards some other victim, with little or no gain to society as a
whole. Indeed, shifting the incidence of misdeeds from one party to another will typically
produce net social losses—building the wall uses up resources without reducing kidnapping at
all, and may even create negative externalities in the form of too many walls.19
Our bottom line is that loss controls can sometimes reduce some kinds of moral hazard caused
by third parties. Unlike eﬀorts to limit ﬁrst-party losses, however, loss control activities directed
against third parties are socially suboptimal: insurers will choose the wrong scope and type of
loss controls because they do not take suﬃcient account of the externalities that third-party loss
controls engender.
19

A further wrinkle is that precautions that are unobservable to potential wrong-doers may
yield social gains. For example, if kidnappers can’t tell who has an alarm system and who
doesn’t, then when A installs a new alarm, she raises the average level of precautions
among all victims, and hence lowers the expected return to kidnapping generally (Ayres
& Levitt 1998).
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3.2.2. Monitoring
Another approach to limiting ordinary moral hazard is through monitoring of the insured’s
conduct. The conventional wisdom is that if an insured’s actions can be perfectly observed, it
becomes possible to write a contract that speciﬁes the degree of riskiness the insured is able to
undertake, eliminating the problem of moral hazard altogether (Holmstrom 1979).
Of course, third parties can be diﬃcult to monitor, since they operate in the wild and their
identities are not known to the insurer in advance of any loss they cause. But ﬁrst-party
monitoring can be used to deter some kinds of third-party moral hazard, since loss-causers must
usually interact with insureds in some fashion in order to create a compensable injury.
For example, automobile dashboard cameras would seem to reduce the possibilities for third
party moral hazard in automobile insurance. It is therefore surprising that the technology has not
been widely adopted in the US, although it is used in other countries.20 One explanation is that
American auto insurers do not oﬀer discounts for cars with dash cams (dashcameras 2021;
Evangelista 2015), as their British counterparts aggressively do, with premium reductions of 10
to 30 percent (Times of London 2018). But that begs the question of why not. We note that
mandatory minimum coverage in UK auto insurance is roughly two orders of magnitude higher
than in the US.21 That gives UK insurers a strong incentive to subsidize this kind of monitoring.
And since U.S. plaintiﬀs’ lawyers typically limit their claims to the amount of the defendant’s
insurance coverage (Baker 2001), American drivers have reduced incentives to purchase a dash
cam to protect their own assets.
3.2.3. Pre-Committing to (ﬁrst party) Moral Hazard?22
Most liability insurance policies give the insurer the duty of covering both the underlying loss
(the duty to indemnify) and any legal defense mounted by the insured (the duty to defend)
(Silver 2015); Richmond 2016). The logic for doing so is clear: if policyholders paid for their own
defense, but insurers covered any damages for which the policyholder was ultimately found
liable, the insured would want to spend almost nothing on defending the claim, since any
damages would ultimately be paid by the insurer. Usually, therefore, the duty to defend is
bundled with the right to control the defense: the party that has to pay (here, the insurer) gets to
choose how to organize the defense and how much to spend. Allocating the costs of defense and
20

Roughly one-quarter of British motorists use dash-cameras (Aviva, 2018). They are also very
widely used in Russia (Lavrinc 2013).
21
As noted earlier, English motorists must have at least £1,200,000 ($1.7 million) in property
damage coverage for any vehicle. While we have been unable to uncover any oﬃcial survey of
minimum coverage requirements in US auto insurance, our calculations suggest that the mean
requirement for liability coverage across US states is only $17,000, with a median of $15,000; two
states, Iowa and New Hampshire, have no minimum coverage at all. Findlaw.com (2021).
22
We owe the key insight in this section to a conversation with Steve Thel.
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the payment of liability with the same party avoids the obvious moral hazard problems that
occur when a party has to pay to prevent losses to someone else.
Puzzlingly, however, some liability insurance contracts separate the duty to defend and the right
to control the defense. This pattern is observed in D&O insurance (Silver, 2015), as well as areas
such as errors and omissions in professional services, and some excess loss policies
(Nierengarten 2013, 7; Nierengarten 2012; Richmond (2016) provides sample language and
citations). Some patent-infringement liability insurance has this feature as well.23 Technically, this
is known as a “duty to reimburse” or as a “defense cost indemniﬁcation policy,” rather than a
typical duty to defend.24 Given the logic above, its existence seems puzzling: Why would
insurers cede control over the defense and agree to let policyholders freely spend the insurance
company’s money to defend against liability that policyholders will not have to pay?
One explanation is that insurers with reimbursement duties do retain some control over defense
costs through “co-control” language, which allows them to forestall some moral hazard
problems (Nierengarten 2012). But here, ﬁrst party moral hazard may be a feature, not a bug,
because it can be used to control third party moral hazard.
Suppose insureds face the possibility of strike suits that are brought purely for their settlement
value. (These are suits that would lose if they were litigated, but for which the costs of mounting
a defense are high relative to the costs of bringing a claim (Cooter & Rubinfeld 1989, 1083).) By
prepaying (sinking the cost) for an insurance policy that covers generous spending to defend
against litigation, insureds are able to make a credible commitment that they will not settle if
sued.25 In turn, that should mean that plaintiﬀs will be deterred from ﬁling strike suits in the ﬁrst
23

See, e.g., http://patentinsuranceonline.com/Defense.html, which states that
upon compliance with the policy terms, [the insurer] will then authorize the lawsuit ﬁled
against you. You have choice (sic) of legal counsel to represent you in the lawsuit; however,
[insurer] may suggest reliable and preferred counsel for you to use—but the choice is yours.
You also decide the ﬁnal settlement terms.
24
“A defense-cost-indemniﬁcation policy is an insurance policy in which the insurer agrees to pay
the costs of defense of a covered legal action and does not undertake the duty to defend. Typically,
such policies also cover settlements and judgments.” Restatement of the Law of Liability Insurance
§ 22 (2019).
25
A public promise by the policyholder herself to vigorously litigate all claims would not be
credible if she had to spend her own money to do so: when the time came, the insured would ﬁnd
it in her interests to settle to avoid having to incur the defense costs. But if she had already sunk
the costs of insurance coverage, the marginal cost of litigation would be zero and the policyholder
would thus want to spend lavishly on defense if she were sued. Leaving the duty to pay for
defense costs with the insurer runs into the reverse commitment problem—the insurer would
want to settle cheaply, rather than litigate. It is only by separating the decision about how much to
spend on litigation from the duty to pay for these costs that the parties can sustain a credible
commitment not to settle, and thereby deter litigation. After writing this, we discovered a more
formal treatment of these ideas (Llobet & Suarez 2012; for a more elaborate model that situates
liability insurance in a mechanism-design context, see Lemus, et al 2020.)
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instance, knowing that policyholders will want to freely spend their insurer’s money to hire the
best lawyers and use them extensively in defending against any claims. In equilibrium, therefore,
defense reimbursement will not actually be necessary, and premiums can be quite low as a result.
If the duty to reimburse is used as a commitment device to deter strike suits in some kinds of
liability insurance, an obvious question is why it is not used more broadly. One possibility is that
it is employed where strike suits are common and the plaintiﬀ’s bar is highly specialized and
strategically sophisticated. That is a plausible characterization of the securities and the patent
litigation landscapes. But where the plaintiﬀ’s bar is insuﬃciently sophisticated, attempts to
deter lawsuits by pre-sinking legal costs may not work. For example, most employment litigation
is brought by unspecialized and unsophisticated lawyers (Moss (2013)), who might not
understand how a pre-paying for defense costs shape defendants’ litigation incentives. Thus, we
might expect that Employment Practices Liability Insurance (EPLI) would use a duty to defend,
as appears to be the case,26 rather than a duty to reimburse.
3.3. Governmental Assistance
Insurers are constrained by contractual privity in coping with third party moral hazard. The
contract between the insurer and policyholder can govern some aspects of the latter’s behavior,
but is much less useful in controlling the behavior of third parties.27 Moreover, to the extent that
insurers can deal with these problems, they may face the wrong incentives in doing so. These
constraints, we believe, create an important role for governmental actors, whose powers are
much broader and whose incentives diﬀer.
Some kinds of third party moral hazard are independent crimes. Where that is the case (as, for
example, schemes of the type described by Rashbaum et al (2018)), enhanced criminal
enforcement is likely to be the best way of deterring large-scale third party moral hazard. As the
head of the New York State Trial Lawyers Association put it, “[T[he easiest and the most direct
way to [reduce no-fault auto insurance fraud] is better law enforcement eﬀorts.” (Timko 2011,
205). Even where no criminal conduct is at stake, the state can still play a useful role by barring
certain kinds of third party moral hazard, as Massachusetts and a few other states have chosen to
do in the case of drug copay coupons discussed earlier.
26

We are unaware of any survey of the prevailing treatment of defense costs in EPLI policies. One
industry insider has observed that “EPLI policies are of the ‘duty to defend’ variety” (Monteleone
1996, 160). Cf, Mount Vernon Fire Ins. Co. v. Visionaid, Inc., 477 Mass. 343, 345 (2017) (“policy
provided that [insurer] had ‘the right and duty to defend any Claim to which this insurance
applies’”).
27
Consider a repair shop that seeks to overcharge a customer, knowing she has insurance. First, as
noted in Section 2.4, insured customers have no reason to push for lower charges. And while it
might be possible to write the insurance contract in a way that required both parties to
demonstrate that the repair costs are justiﬁed, this would be diﬃcult and costly to implement. And
the evidence cited in notes 5, 6, 8, and 14 suggests that in fact, the problem is not actually solved.
Detecting overpayment is far from straightforward in most contexts; that is certainly the case in
health care, where overbilling has proven very diﬃcult to constrain (Hyman and Silver 2018).
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State intervention does risk crowding-out some private enforcement eﬀorts. But because
governmental actors do not face the same proﬁt motives that insurers do, public enforcement can
complement private eﬀorts. At the margin, insurers have a built-in incentive to deny claims of
ambiguous validity.28 Shifting some of the job of apprehending third party loss-causers to the
state therefore eases pressure on insurers to deny claims, and beneﬁts legitimate claimants.
As an alternative to pure public or private enforcement, there are some hybrid models of
public-private cooperation that are also worth considering. For example, some insurers have
created and funded task forces to work with law enforcement at reducing fraud (National
Insurance Crime Bureau, n.d.). These oﬀer the advantages of economies of scale and insider
knowledge, combined with the heightened powers of public enforcement.
3.3.1. Technology Standardization and Reporting
An obvious role for collective action in combating third party moral hazard is to regulate the
collection and transmission of data that can be used to detect it. For example, US life insurers
have established a system of record-keeping for “police departments to check if a homicide
victim is named on a life insurance policy. Several perpetrators have been arrested and convicted
thanks to this system” (Coalition Against Insurance Fraud 2017, 7). In 2018, English police and
dash-camera manufacturers collaborated on a national dash cam safety portal, which “allows
owners of any brand of dash cam to submit footage quickly and easily to the relevant
authorities” (Muyanja 2018).

3.3.2. Cartelization or Regulation of Industry Structure
As Shortland (2019) persuasively demonstrated in the case of kidnap insurance, some types of
third party moral hazard can be managed through the structural design (“governance”) of
insurance market contracting. If insurance is provided by a small group of sellers, with close
social ties and the ability and incentives to share information, it may be possible to overcome the
dynamic coordination problems that would occur when individual victims make separate
payments out of their own pockets.
As we explained earlier, one-time victims of kidnapping are more willing to overpay for ransom
demands than are repeat players. Given an upward-sloping supply curve for kidnappings,
overpaying today will generate additional entry (more kidnappings) in the future. But one-time
victims do not care about the eﬀects of their own overpayment on the volume of future
28

Feinman (2010) argues that insurers’ chief strategy for claims-handing boils down to “Delay.
Deny. Defend.” To counteract these tendencies, there has emerged an elaborate set of rules, both
statutory and judicially-constructed, accompanied by signiﬁcant penalties, governing what
constitutes “bad faith denial of an insurance claim.” For a recent empirical analysis, see Asmat &
Tennyson (2014).
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kidnappings. By contrast, repeat players (such as kidnap insurers) will take future supply
responses into account in assessing how much to pay today. An eﬀective insurance cartel can
therefore limit the incentives to overpay that would otherwise accompany individualized
ransom decisions. The countervailing eﬀects of monopoly power vs combatting third party
moral hazard awaits further analysis.
3.3.3. Qui Tam Suits
In addition to the possibilities just discussed, we propose the recognition of a new private cause
of action, an insurance qui tam suit. The idea is to allow private individuals to bring suits on
behalf of insurers against persons or entities who ﬁle false claims for insurance payments,
collecting a fraction of the amount recovered as a bounty. Doing so ampliﬁes disincentives for
misconduct; importantly, it accomplishes this goal without altering the delicate balance of power
that courts and regulators have sought to create between insurers and their policyholders (Baker,
1997 (liability insurance); Asmat & Tennyson, 2014 (bad faith)).
At its simplest, qui tam litigation expands ordinary notions of standing by oﬀering a bounty to
plaintiﬀs who bring suits to recover losses experienced by someone else, traditionally, the
sovereign.29 For example, in return for surfacing the problem and pursuing litigation against
their co-conspirators, a doctor involved in a phony clinic that was set up to treat accident victims
in one of the no-fault auto insurance scams in New York (Bharara 2015; Rashbaum et al 2018;
Insurance Information Institute, n.d.) would be entitled to a percentage of whatever recovery
was obtained for the insurance company.
Our model is based on existing anti-fraud legislation at the federal level, the False Claims Act
(31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2009)), which was used to recover more than $2.5 billion in Medicare and
Medicaid claims in 2016 alone (Nguyen & Perez 2020). While qui tam liability is not without
controversy, the evidence in health care and elsewhere suggests that it has been eﬀective. Our
proposal would extend this mechanism to private insurers and to other areas of insurance.
3.3.3.1. Why Qui Tam Insurance Suits can be Useful
Litigation theory (Cooter & Rubinfeld 1989) suggests that proﬁt-maximizing private actors
should be willing to bring any case with a positive expected value. That would seem to imply
that insurance companies already have a good reason to sue any third party who caused them
losses (as long as they believe they can recover more than the costs of the litigation). Moreover,
insurers can often make use of the law of subrogation, which allows them to pay the claims of
their insured and then go after those who caused the loss to recover the amount paid. Given all
that, there might seem to be little reason to supplement ordinary liability by bringing in an
additional class of plaintiﬀs (relators).
29

Engstrom (2007, 1244) discusses nearly a dozen scholarly articles advocating qui tam-like
mechanisms in other areas of law.
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However, there are at least four reasons why insurers might not choose to pursue third party
loss-causers optimally. First, insurers don’t necessarily want to prevent all losses, and may not
zealously go after loss-causers. Insurers may prefer higher losses if they increase demand for
insurance on the margin (Avraham & Porat, forth.)
Second, theory suggests that insurance fraud is an equilibrium phenomenon (Picard 1996; Picard
2013; Davies 2018, 16-17); under plausible conditions, there will always be some fraud that
insurers will optimally choose not to uncover, leaving at least the possibility that others may be
able and willing to do so. The logic of this insight is as follows. Suppose initially that 10 percent
of all claims are fraudulent. Suppose further that at some cost, insurers could audit each claim
and perfectly detect whether it is fraudulent. Even if such audits are proﬁt-maximizing (that is,
they cost less than the expected savings they generate) when 10 percent of claims are fraudulent,
they will certainly not be proﬁtable once all fraud has been successfully detected and deterred.
At that point, of course, there will be no fraud left to detect, so there will be no justiﬁcation for
spending anything to detect it. But if insurers stop auditing altogether, fraudsters can go back to
committing fraud, secure in the knowledge that they won’t be caught. Unless insurers can
credibly commit to always auditing (even when it is unproﬁtable), a zero-fraud equilibrium is
impossible.
Third, insurers may simply lack information about whom to sue because deliberate loss-causing
is invariably covert. Even when the necessary information can be uncovered through audits or
other techniques (and that is not always the case), these can be costly and diﬃcult to undertake.
But third party “insiders” will often have the information necessary to pursue such
litigation—they know how such schemes are organized and implemented, including the
techniques used to conceal them. So they will operate with an informational advantage over
insurers, and may ﬁnd it worthwhile to pursue litigation that insurers would not ﬁnd it
cost-eﬀective to uncover.
Finally, the problem is not simply that insurers are uninformed or under-zealous. Indeed,
insurers are known to be overzealous—at least at times—for example, in denying claims of loss
by their own policyholders (Feinman 2010; Baker 1997; Asmat and Tennyson 2015, 413).
Analogously, liability insurers will at times prefer to litigate too aggressively, against the
interests of their policyholders (Keeton 1954).30 In response, the law has restricted insurer power
vis-a-vis policyholders, but in ways that may actually advantage third party loss-causers. That
is, in structuring relations between insurers and their customers to avoid disadvantaging the
latter, the law may at times create opportunities for others to exploit. Our qui tam mechanism is
designed to limit such opportunities, but importantly, to do so without strengthening insurers’
positions vis-a-vis their policyholders.

30

One area where this can occur is when the plaintiﬀ makes a claim in excess of the limits of the
insured’s policy. Under a rule where the insurer pays nothing over the policy limits, it is in a
position to gamble (go to trial) with the policyholder’s money: if it wins, it pays only its trial costs;
if it loses, the defendant pays the verdict in excess of the policy limits. See Keeton (1954) or Sykes
(1994) for analytic details.
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For example, most states (and the Restatement of the Law of Liability Insurance) now require
that in making a decision to settle or litigate a claim against a policyholder that exceeds the
coverage limits of the insured’s liability policy, an insurer must act as “would . . . a reasonable
insurer that bears the sole ﬁnancial responsibility for the full amount of the potential
judgment.”31 As Allen Sykes (1994) pointed out, the rule can in some cases lead to settlements
that are more generous to the plaintiﬀ than would be the case if the insurer had unfettered
discretion to litigate.32 In turn, that will provide an increased incentive for third party moral
hazard. Rather than trying to curb such behavior by repealing the widely-adopted “disregard
the limits” rule, qui tam litigation oﬀers a way to reduce the proﬁtability of strike suits without
upsetting the carefully-crafted balance of power between insurers and insureds.
The existence of bad-faith liability—for example, for failure to settle, or for delay in processing a
claim—serves similar aims as the disregard the limits rule, and has similar consequences.
Policymakers have concluded that there is a need to control insurers’ discretion in paying claims
in order to protect policyholders against insurers’ dilatory tactics. For example, New York had a
requirement that “insurance companies . . . pay … claims submitted by no-fault providers
within 30 days of their submission.” (Ferguson 2011, 66). But there is some evidence that
sophisticated third parties were able to swamp insurers’ claims-handling and investigatory
resources by submitting grossly exaggerated claims for reimbursement at a rate that was too
high for insurers to handle within statutorily-required time limits for payment (Id.; Bharara
2015). If insurers are subject to damages for wrongly failing to pay a claim or paying too late,
they will at the margin be induced to pay some questionable claims (Browne, Pryor & Puelz
2004; Tennyson & Warfel 2008; Asmat & Tennyson 2014). In turn, this makes loss-creation more
proﬁtable for third parties.
While some of these problems might be corrected by beeﬁng-up insurers’ discretion over claims
disposition, policymakers have concluded that doing so would unduly tilt the balance of power
between insurers and policyholders in favor of the former. Our proposed qui tam system
therefore incentivizes other actors to supplement the enforcement eﬀorts of insurance companies
through a bounty scheme. Such a system boosts deterrence without advantageing insurers in
their relations with policyholders.
31

Restatement of the Law of Liability Insurance § 24(2) (2019). “Bears the sole ﬁnancial
responsibility” is another way of saying that the insurer’s settle/litigate decision should be made
as if there were no policy limits and the insurer were thus responsible for the entire judgment.
“The disregard-the-limits standard was ﬁrst articulated by Professor Keeton in 1954 . . . and . . has
since become the most common test for determining whether an insurer gave ‘equal
consideration’ to its insured's interests in duty-to-settle cases.” Id.
32
The analysis is complicated, and depends on many assumptions. As Alan Sykes points out, if
the insured has limited assets, the disregard the limits rule “can increase plaintiﬀ’s expected
returns from litigation by reducing the extent to which the insured’s inability to pay large
judgments lowers the plaintiﬀ’s expected receipts” (Sykes 1994, 1367). If there are punitive
damages for an insurer’s failure to settle, as in some states, that can also raise plaintiﬀ’s
settlement demands. “In sum, it is certainly plausible that the disregard-the-limits rule will
weaken the bargaining position of the insurer and the insured in important classes of cases.” Id. at
1367.
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3.3.3.2. How Insurance Qui Tam Actions Would Work
Qui tam relators can have an important cost or informational advantage over insurers, because
they themselves are often insiders, already well-acquainted with the speciﬁcs of how a given
loss-causing scheme operates. They may not need to investigate, audit, or detect anything, since
their jobs are precisely to execute some aspect of the scheme at issue. In other cases, relators may
possess detailed knowledge of how fraudulent activity is carried, knowledge that outsiders
lack.
Qui tam liability oﬀers potential whistleblowers an incentive to “defect” by turning against their
fellow miscreants (Engstrom 2007, 1250). In turn, that should make it more diﬃcult for
conspiracies to form in the ﬁrst place by weakening trust among conspirators, each of whom
will have to worry that one of their partners might turn against them to collect a qui tam bounty.
The design of an insurance qui tam action should incorporate some of the same safeguards used
in the False Claims Act (FCA) to prevent over-enforcement and agency problems (Engstrom
2007, 1271-72). Just as the Federal government does under the FCA, insurers should play a
supplementary role in qui tam litigation. Otherwise, relators could just initiate a lawsuit on their
own and then settle the matter at a steep discount, precluding the insurer from litigating similar
claims against the defendant. Hence, we would grant insurers the power to oppose settlements
that are detrimental to their interests. Only if the insurer declines to litigate the case would
relators have the ability to proceed independently.
Finally, and in parallel with the FCA, we would also allow the insurer to intervene and “take
control over the litigation, including limiting a relator's procedural rights” (Engstrom 2007,
1272-73) in appropriate cases in which third party moral hazard is especially damaging. A
relator’s award under our proposal would be comparable to those oﬀered under the FCA: 25 to
30 percent if the relator litigates alone and 10 to 15 percent if the insurer takes over.
We believe that the use of qui tam litigation has the potential to deter third party moral hazard,
and can do so without strengthening insurers’ hands vis-a-vis their own policyholders.
CONCLUSION
In the process of transferring risk, insurance does not merely reduce the incentives of
policyholders to prevent losses. It may also increase the proﬁtability of illicit attempts to transfer
wealth, and may facilitate meritorious litigation, when insureds would otherwise lack the wealth
to pay for harms they have caused. The key point is that its eﬀects can spill over from the
contract between the policyholder and the insurer to inﬂuence the behavior of those who interact
with them in a variety of complex ways that scholars have only begun to appreciate. Moreover,
these insurance externalities are diﬃcult to manage with the contractual tools that insurers have
long used to control standard moral hazard problems. We thus need to begin thinking about
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insurance in a broader general equilibrium framework that encompases actors beyond just the
insurer and policyholder.
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